State v. Pratt Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 40940 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-20-2014
State v. Pratt Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40940
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Pratt Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40940" (2014). Not Reported. 1412.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1412
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
oOo 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Supreme Court No. 40940-2013 
Plaintiff/ Respondent 
vs. 
JOSEPH EARL PRATT, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the First 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho 
In and for the County of 8JoM\.er 
Joseph Earl Pratt 
29518, ISCI, Unit 13 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
(208) 336-0740, ext. 4570 
Appellant prose 
HONORABLE BARBARA BUCHANAN 
District Judge 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
(208) 334-2400 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . •.•••••••....•..••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••• • -,,.ii 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2 
A. Nature of the Case ................................................. 2 
B. General Course of Proceedings ....................................... 2 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 
IV. ARGUMENT ••..•••.•••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••.••.•••.•••••••.•••••••• 5 
A. Standard of Review ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
B. Did the District Court fail to correct an illegal sentence where 
the sentencing court created constitutional error when it relied 
upon improper aggravating circumstances that would be sufficient 
to outweigh mitigating circumstances requiring the sentencing 
court to conduct new sentencing proceedia,s •••••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
1. Facts pertaining to argument •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
2. Why relief should be granted ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1O 
a. The district court's unconstitutional action that makes 
Pratt's sentences illegal •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 
b. Pratt is entitled to be present when the Court imposes 
the sentence upon him, and the Court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction to impose teh sentence without 
Pratt being present for it denies him the right to 
allocution ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 13 
c. Pratt was entitled to a new sentencing hearing to 
ensure a clear record and protect him against misuse 
of the information in the PSI due to the reversal of 
two felony convictions ••.......•••.....••.....•.........• 15 
d. Pratt's current Rule 35 is not subject to res judicata ••• 17 
V. CONCLUSION . •...••.••.•.•••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••.•••••.••••.•• . 18 
VI. CERTIFICATE OF MAILING • .•• · .••••••••••••.••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••• • 19 
i 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Federal Cases 
Beam v. Paskett, 966 F.2d 1553 (9th Cir. 1992) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ll,12 
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 14 
U.S. V. TUcker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 14 
State Cases 
State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 60 P.3d 153 (2003) ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 14 
State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 218 P.3d 1143 (2009) •••••••••••••••• 5, 10, 11 
State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262 (Ct.App. 2003) ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 15, 16 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007) ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
State v. Lute, 252 P.3d 1255 (2001) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950 (Ct.App. 2010) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 15, 16 
State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178 (1991) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 16 
State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 226 P.3d 552 (2010) ••••••••••••••••••••••• 14 
State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 875 P.2d 800 (1994) •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 13 
State v. (James) Pratt, 125 Idaho 594, 873 P.2d 848 (1994) ••••••••• 2, 6, 7, 10 
Idaho Statutes And Rules 
§ 18-400 3 ( b ) .......•........•....................•.•.•........ 6 , 7 , 12 , 15 , 16 
§ 18-4003 ( d) ................................................................. 7 
§ 19-2515 ............................................................. 3, 6, 18 
ICR 32 ...........•.••..........•.......•....•.....•.............•.•.•... 12, 15 
ICR 33 ••.•••.•.•••••....••••..•..•.....•••••••.•.••••.••••••••..••.•.• • .13·.,- 14 
ICR 33.1 .....•................•...................•...............• . ~-•. ... 3, 13 
ICR 35 . ......•...•...........•.........•..•..•.•.•.............•..•. sic passim 
ii 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the order denying Mr. Pratt's I.C.R. 35 Motion to 
Correct an Illegal Sentence. (R., pp.40-41.) The order denying the I.C.R. 35 
for the district court abused its discretion in applying the doctrine of res j1AJ1e-ct+&1.. 
for it was not plead by the respondent, and Pratt was entitled to a new 
sentencing hearing for the state court relied on improper mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances and, committed constitutional error when the district 
court refused to conduct a new sentencing hearing upon the Idaho Supreme Court 
having vacated the conviction for first degree murder of a peace officer in the 
lawful discharge of his official duties. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Pratt hereby sets forth the general course of proceedings as those that 
were stated in State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 594, 873 P.2d 848 (Idaho 1994) and that 
which the district court set forth in its order denying the I.C.R. 35 (R., pp.40-
42). 
Mr. Pratt, then on February 7, 2013, presented a I.C.R. 35 Motion to Correct 
the Illegal Sentence (R., pp.13-12) and supported it with an accompanying 
memorandum in which he pointed out that when he was originally sentenced in the 
matters on November 27, 1989, the sentencing court found, regarding mitigating 
and aggravating circumstances pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2513 and Rule 33.1, 
I.C.R., that Mr. Pratt had killed a peace officer in the lawful discharge of his 
official duties. (R., pp.17-19.) 
Mr. Pratt further pointed out that due to the Idaho Supreme Court having 
vacated the conviction for murder of a peace officer under Idaho Code 18-4003(b) 
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and ~ ]J a S:ei, that upon the Idaho Supreme Court doing so the sentencing 
court was required to conduct a new sentencing hearing in order to give Pratt 
a full and fair opportunity to submit a new Mitigation Report and permit the 
sentencing court to make new written findings concerning mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances in his case pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2515 and 
Rule 33.1, I.C.R, as well as permit Pratt to make proper corrections to the 
Presentence Investigation Report. All due to it being determined that Mr. Pratt 
did not murder a peace officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties. 
(R •• , pp.21-33.) 
Respondent did not file any response to Mr. Pratt's I.C.R. 35, and the 
district court in its order denying the Rule 35, held that Pratt's sentences have 
been repeatedly reviewed by the district court, as well as by the Idaho appellate 
courts, and a final judgment had already been rendered thereon. The district court 
also applied the doctrine of res judicata precluding Pratt from relitigating the 
same issues in this Rule 35 proceeding, and refused to address his substantive 
arguments. (R., p.42.) 
1 This appeal followed. (R., pp.44-47.) 
1 Mr. Pratt Jlbtioned this Court to take judicial notice of the fomer appellate records in Supraze 
Court Case No. 18485, which this Court granted on Septa:nl:a- 4, 2014. Mr. Pratt with the filing of 
this Brief has sul:m:i.tted a Second Jlbtion to Take Judicial Notice regarding the previous Rule 35 
Jlbtions that were part of previous Clerk's Records on appeal in order to render a proper decision 
in respects to this pending appeal. Mr. Pratt is unaware of the S.Ct. Ibcket No.' s of then. 
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the District court exercised an abuse of discretion in denying 
the I.C.R. 35 when its issues were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of clearly established State and Federal Law, as determined by 
the Idaho Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States: 
A. Did the District Court fail to correct an illegal sentence where the 
sentencing court created constitutional error when it relied upon 
improper aggravating circumstances that would be sufficient to 
outweigh mitigating circumstances requiring the sentencing court to 
a conduct new sentencing proceedings. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
Idaho Rule 35 allows a trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any 
time. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009); State v. 
Lute, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257 (2011); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 
838, 840 (2007). 
B. Did the District Court fail to correct an illegal sentence where the 
sentencing court created constitutional error when it relied upon 
improper aggravating circumstances that would be sufficient to 
outweigh mitigating circumstances requiring the sentencing court to 
conduct new sentencing proceedings. 
1. Facts pertaining to argument 
Mr. Pratt having been found guilty of seventeen felonies after a jury trial, 
the district court ordered that a presentence investigation report was ordered. 
After the pre-sentence report was held, a sentencing hearing was held on September 
5, 1989, with Mr. Pratt and his counsel present. The district court heard relevant 
evidence in aggravation and mitigation and arguments thereto, the district court 
had requested that counsel submit written proposed findings of aggravation and 
mitigation. Pursuant to the district court's request, counsel for both parties 
did so. At the hearing as well Pratt's counsel requested a psychological evaluation 
be done, was ordered and filed with the Court. (#18485, R., p.782) 
On November 27, 1989, having received counsel for the parties evidence in 
aggravation and mitigation conducted a sentencing hearing (R., p.5) and also issued 
its Findings as was requiredhy Idaho Code~ 19-2515 and Rule 33.1, of the Idaho 
Criminal Rules (#18485, R., pp.774-794.) 
The district court was asked to consider many mitigating circumstances in 
respects to his age, record, family background, among other things. (#18485, R., 
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pp. 783-787.) The district court set forth its aggravating circumstances beyond 
reasonable doubt regarding the seventeen felonies that were before the court for 
sentencing (#18485, R., pp.788-790) and then set forth specific statutory 
aggravating circumstances (#18485, R., pp.790-192). Specifically, the court rejected 
the request to also find the aggravating circumstance regarding the killing of 
Brent Jacobson constituted the killing of a police officer because of the exercise 
of his official duty (#18485, R., pp.791-792). The district court rejected this 
reqeust and specifically identified I.C. 18-4003(b) in the crime of murder or 
killing of a peace officer acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty and 
who was also known or should have been known by the perpetrator to be an officer 
so acting. (#18485, R., p.791-92.) The court then set forth its mitigating 
circumstances versus aggravating circumstances (#18485, R., pp.792-794.) 
As a direct result of the district court's Findings (#18485, R., pp.774-791) 
it sentenced Pratt on Count 17, felony murder conviction, specifically of murder 
or killing of a peace officer acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty 
and who was also known or should have been known by the perpetrator to be an 
officer so acting. The district court relied on I.C. 19-2515(g)(7) and (9). 
Mr. Pratt appealed the sentences and convictions and as a result the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v. (James) Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993) vacated 
Joseph Pratt's convcition on Count 16, attempted felony murder. Upon the Court's 
1993 Opinion dated July 27, 1993, Pratt filed a Petition for Rehearing, and on 
August 27, 1993, a supporting Brief seeking rehearing of the July 27, 1993 Opinion. 
The Idaho Supreme Court on March 18, 1994, denied Pratt's Petition for Rehearing 
and further withdrew its July 27, 1993 Opinion and issued its Substitute Opinion 
dated March 18, 1994. State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 594, 873 P.2d 848 (1994). 
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Tn the Supreme Courts 1994 Substitute Opinion it had found that under 
Count 17, First Degree Murder Conviction, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-4003(b), 
was incorrect in their 1993 Opinion for the deceased victim was not acting as a 
peace officer in the discharge of his official duties. The Court though upheld 
the conviction of First Degree Murder under I.C. § 18-4003(d) for his conviction 
did not rest solely upon I.C. 18-4003(b). State v. Pratt, 873 P.2d 852. Pratt 
sought review again on April 8, 1994, and was denied on June 3, 1994. The Court 
also issued its Remittitur and further "Ordered that the District Court shall 
forthwith comply with the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required." 
The district court acknowledged receipt of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
Remittitur but did not do anything in respects to the Court's ruling. As a result 
t , 9 7 3 p I ·I1r es Mr. Pratt filed a ICR 35, correction of sentence 
followed by a Amended Motion for Correction of Sentence. The district court on 
November 15, 2000, without Mr. Pratt being present issued its Order Denying the 
Rule 35. 
The district court, with Hon. James F. Judd, presiding, issued a 4 page Order 
regarding Pratt's I.C.R. 35 motion granted it in part and denied in part, and 
ordered a Second Corrected Judgments and Sentence shall be entered. Here, the 
court held that the trial court failed to correct the judgment and sentence 
pursuant ,to State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 594, 873 P.2d 848 (1994) and held the 
corrected judgments be reentered with the provision for Count XVI stricken, and 
in respects to Count VXII, stated: "The person he murdered was a law enforcement 
officer although he was not a 'peace officer in the lawful discharge of his official 
duty' under I.C. § 18-4003(b). 11 With the Order a Second Corrected Judgments and 
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Sentence was to be entered. 2 The Court also in respects to Pratt's murder conviction 
upheld the matter without Pratt present, and stated "no basis to Revisit Pratt's 
sentences." (See Appendix A, page bates labeled p.80 by the Clerk.) 
Mr. Pratt then filed a second I.C.R. 35 seeking correction of an illegal 
sentence on March 23, 2007, with several continuances taking place the matter was 
finally denied on June 19, 2008. (#40940 R., pp.7-9; see also #35602).~ 
Mr. Pratt then filed a third I.C.R. 35 seeking correction of sentence in which 
he cited to several reasons but not one being that the court needed to permit him 
a new sentencing hearing, but not one citing specifically to that of making 
the sentencing court issue new findings and corrections to the presentence 
investigation report. (See APPENDIX A, possibly marked as pp. 198-201.) Again, 
the district court denied this. (It should be noted the ROA in the current 
Clerk's Record does not show this Rule 35 listed. R., p.7 but shows a entry dated 
3/22/2007.) 
On January 14, 2004, Pratt filed a fourth I.C.R. 35 motion for correction 
of sentence listing several reasons why the court should find in his favor to 
conduct a new sentencing hearing, most specifically abuse of discretion on the 
district court for not conducting a new sentencing hearing, and the outcome would 
be different if the court would just permit Pratt a new sentencing hearing in order 
to correct the Findings, but no mention to the PSI. (See Appendix A, labled as 
pp.211-214, for this does not appear in the Record lodged in this case on the ROA 
pp.5-12.) 
2 Mr. Pratt has requested the O:rurt in a "Second Motion to Take Judicial Notice" underlying Clerk's 
Records on appeal to take notice of. In one of these records set forth in the second motion should 
be the district court's Order and Second Corrected Judgnent and Sentence. A copy is attached. as 
APPENDIX A in order to see what was actually written and make a proper decision on the Issue on 
Appeal. 
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Mr. Pratt filed a fifth I.C.R. 35 for correction of illegal sentence and a 
supporting brief on March 23, 2007 which after a series of status conference 
hearings and a Memorandum In Support followed by the respondents response and then 
Pratts reply with the district court finally issuing its Order Denying the ICR 
35 and Reqeust for New or Additional Sentencing Hearing. (#40940, R, pp.~7-9~) Then 
was followed by a Fifth I.C.R. 35 to correct illegal sentence on July 28, 2008, 
and the court issuing its Order denying the ICR 35 and Notice of Right to Appeal. 
#40940, R. pp.9-10.) Pratt appealed and this Court on October 16, 2009 in an 
Upublished Opinion #637 affirmed the Orders denying the motions for correction 
of sentences. 
As a result Pratt then filed a sixth I.C.R. 35 seeking correction of an illegal 
sentence with a supporting memorandum (#40940, R., pp. 13-19) in where he was 
specific in that he was not afforded a sentencing hearing de novo or a modification 
hearing in light of the fact that he was mistakenly sentenced pursuant to Idaho 
Code 18-4003(b), murder of a peace officer. (#40940, R., pp. 21-34.) 
Despite a Pratt having set forth an argument for the first time that his 
sentences were predicated upon substantially incorrect information due to the 
Supreme Court vacating one of his felony counts in its entirety, Count 16 and that 
Count 17 was determined not to be murder of a peace officer based upon an 
erroneous decision by the district court on November 27, 1989 when it published 
it findings. (#40940, R., pp.23-34.) 
The district court chose to ignore Pratt's arguments and determined in her 
Order dismissing the I.C.R. 35 that the doctrine of res judicata precludes Pratt 
from relitigating the same issues in this Rule 35. (#40940, R., p. 42.) 
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2. Why relief should be granted 
Mr. Pratt has presented an issue that has yet to be addressed by any court 
for the first time in respects to his sentence being illegal. Pratt is not 
asking the Court to re-examine the underlying facts of the crimes which he was 
found guilty to by jury trial. It is clear on the face of the record that 
since the Idaho Supreme Court vacated Count XVI and vacated the fact that the 
victim in relation to Count XVII was not a law enforcement officer has changed 
what the sentencing court had issued in its findings on November 27, 1989 (#18485, 
R., pp.774-794.) After both Pratt's counsel and the counsel for respondent had 
made their oral arguments and submissions to the sentencing court, it was the court 
who made the decision to set forth in the findings upon review of everything that 
was submitted, including the PSI, the court made the decision that Pratt had killed 
a law enforcment officer and relied upon I.C. 18-4003(b). 
Granted, it was latter determined in this Court's Opinion, State v. Pratt, 
125 Idaho 594, 873 P.2d 848 (1994) that Count XVII under I.C. 18-4003(b) was not 
correct and the Court ordered that the conviction be changed to just murder under 
I.C. 18-4003(d). Pratt has never been afforded the full and fair opportunity to 
make corrections to the record upon the Idaho Supreme Court's decision:~in .. this .. ::: 
regard. This is despite the district court on December 15, 2000, just making a 
correction to the record and issuing a "Second Corrected Judgments and Sentence". 
The Idaho Supreme Court held in State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 218 P.3d 
1143 (2009) defined an "illegal sentence" as one that is illegal from the face 
of the record, dose not involve significant questions of fact, and does not 
require an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147. Rule 35 is interpreted 
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narrowly because, as an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time. The Court 
held in Clements: 
rat11er, the rule only applies to a narrow category of cases in which the 
sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law or Mlere 
new evidence tends to show that the original sentence was excessive. 
Clements, 148 Idaho at 86, 218, P.3d at 1147 (citing State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 
219, 223, 177 P.3d 966, 970 (2008)). The Court went onto clarify that the proper 
Rule 35 inquireies necessarily involve only questions of law and may not include 
significant factual determination in order to resolve the merits of a Rule 35 claim; 
if a district court does inquire and make significant factual determinations, 
it exceeds its scope of authrity under Rule 35. Clements, 148 Idaho at 87-88, 
218 P.3d at 1148-49. 
a. The district court's unconstitutional action that makes Pratt's 
sentences illegal 
Under Idaho Law, the state court in a capital case determines the 
appropriateness of tm~ death penalty in a particular case by weighing the 
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating ones. See Idaho Code 19-2525 and 
Rule 33.1, I.C.R., see also Beam v. Paskett, 966 F.2d 1553, 1571 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(internal citations omitted.) 
In this case the state trial judge made an additional finding with respect 
to the balancing process--that any one aggravating circumstance outweighed all 
the mitigating circumstances. That Pratt murdered a law enforcement officer. This 
was overturned by the Idaho Supreme Court latter. As such the "Findings" which 
the sentecing court relied upon and the PSI were erroneous, and therefore the 
"Findings" which were filed by the sentencing court were erroneously decided. All 
requeireing a new sentencing hearing with Pratt present with counsel to make new 
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presentation of aggravation and mitigation and arguments in relation to the case, 
and make corrections to the Presentence Investigation Report through a Motion to 
Srike and Rule 32, ICR. The sentencing court has always been incorrect in respects 
to not affording Pratt a new sentencing hearing. 
The Court in Beam held that, when weighing all the aggravating and mitigating 
factors together, the state court relied on at least one erroneous factor, the 
"utter disregard" aggravating circumstance. For these reasons, we cannot rely on 
the balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances performed ••• --which 
resulted from an invalid weighing of factors--must be vacated. Id. at 1574. 
Here, Pratt's sentencing court relied upon invalid aggravating and mitigating 
factors based upon the fact it was determined on Pratt's review of his Appeal that 
he did not kill a law enforcement officer under I.C. 18-4003(b). That being said 
it required a new sentencing hearing with Pratt being brought before the court 
in person. 
Pratt's sentence has never been revisited given the fact that Pratt did not 
kill a peace officer and is permitted to do so. This material change of fact would 
have a significant impact on Pratt's sentence for First Degree Murder. Such a 
change cannot be made without a hearing. It simply cannot be accomplished by 
inter-lination of the judgment alone. The Court must consider whether Pratt would 
deserve a fixed term of 25 years consecutive to all other sentences as was 
originally imposed absent the aggravating factor of the death of a peace officer 
acting in the course of his duties being removed. (See also, #40940, R., pp.26-
31.) 
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b. Pratt is entitled to be present when the Court imposes the sentence 
upon him, and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to impose 
the sentence without Pratt being present for it denies him the right 
to allocution. 
When the Idaho Supreme Court entered the Order and Opinion in State v. Pratt, 
125 Idaho 546, 875 P.2d 800 (1994), it denied Mr. Pratt the right to present 
evidence in mitigation to the newly imposed sentence. Additionally, it denied him 
his Constitutional due process right to be present at the time a sentence is 
imposed. 
Under Idaho Criminal Rule, Rules 33 and 33.1, it is clear that because the 
state sought imposition of the death penalty, Pratt has a right to have a hearing 
in which he is entitled to present material evidence in mitigation of the offenses. 
Pratt was afforded this the first time. 
Rule 33(a)(2), A. clearly requires that if the defendant is in custody the 
custodial officer shall present the defendant before the court for sentencing. 
(emphasis mine). This did not occur when the Court held issued a new sentencing 
order. 
When Pratt was originally sentenced, the Court weighed these factors and found 
that the death penalty was not warranted. Yet, in this same hearing, the Court 
imposed a sentece of life to run consecutive with all other felonies, becuase 
" ••• the individual killed was a law enforcement officer ••• ". (#18485, R, pp.791-
794.) 
Had the Court not considered this information, now proven to be false, the 
court may have made the sentences run concurrent opposed to consecutive. This maybe 
addressed when this Court holds a new sentencing hearing, where Pratt is entitled 
the assistance of counsel, and has been afforded the right to present corrected 
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aggravating and mitigating factors that he may have in allocution in light of the 
new sentence. 
Due to Rule 33, ICR, and Idaho Law madates that a criminal defendant must 
be present in Court when a felony sentence is imposed, it is submitted that the 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sentence Mr. Pratt, in his absence, 
after the Idaho Supreme Court determined that Pratt's murder conviction was in 
error under I.C. 18-4003(b). 
In the case of Rtate v .• Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 226, P .3d 552 (2010), the 
court held: 
••• an order entered without subject rratter jurisdiction is void. 
A sentence is illegal" within the ITEaning of Rule 35, only if 
it is in excess of statutory limits or otherwise contrary to 
applicable law." 
Citing to, State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 745, 69 P.3d 153, 165 (2003). 
As applied to this case, the sentence imposed is illegal because Mr. Pratt 
was not allowed to be present when the district court imposed the sentence under 
I.C. 18-4003(d), and took away the conviction under I.e. 18-4003(b). Based upon 
this alone, where the sentencing court has relied upon materially false information 
about a defendant's criminal history in making its sentencing decision is a 
violation of due process. See Townsend v.Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); see also 
U.S. v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) holding where a sentence where the sentencing 
court had considered two prior convictions that later were invalidated violated 
due process. This is what has occurred in this instant case, with no remedy being 
afforded to Pratt. 
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c. Pratt was entitled to a new sentencing hearing to ensure a clear record 
and protect him against misuse of the information in the PSI due to the 
reversal of two felony convictions 
When the Idaho Supreme Court vacated one felony conviction in its entirety 
and vacated Count XVII in part regarding the murder of a peace officer 
under I.C. 18-4003(b), the district court cannot just with the stroke of a pen 
remove any references from the sentencing order as was done. It required a new 
sentencing hearing in order to afford Mr. Pratt and counsel of record a full and 
fair opportunity to make corrections to the PSI under Rule 32, of the Idaho Criminal 
Rules, and a motion to strike the errors as well. 
The district court's decisions regarding such motions to strike or delete 
portions of the PSI are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Molen, 148 
Idaho 950, 961 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing I.C.R. 32(e)(l)O. The district court needs 
to consider whether the information in the PSI is reliable because of the nature 
of the document. 
The use of a PSI does not end with the defendant's sentencing. The 
report goes to the fupart:Irent of Corrections and IIBY be considered 
by the O:mnission of Pardons and Parole in evaluating the defendant's 
suitability for parole. See I.C.R. 32(h). In addition, if the 
defendant reoffends, any prior PSI is usually presented to the 
sentencing court with an update report fran the presentence 
investigator. 'Tirus, a PSI follows a defendant indefiniately, and 
infoI1IE.tion inappropriately included therein IIBY prejudice the 
defendant even if the initial sentencing court disregarded such 
inf 0I1IE.tion. 
State v. Rodriquez, 132 Idaho 261, 262 n.1 (Ct. App. 1998). As such potentially 
unreliable information, such as hearsay evidence. State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 
262, 265 (Ct.App. 2003). Furthermore, "[c]onjecture and speculation have no place, 
of course, in a presentence report." Molen, 148 Idaho at 961. Where there is no 
explanation from the presentence investigator as to why he believed the challenged 
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information to be reliable or an affirmation by trail counsel that such information 
to be was not being relied upon, basing a sentence on a speculative PSI is an 
abuser of discretion requiring the vacation of the sentence and remand for 
proper sentencing. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 183 (1991). 
The court has two alternative mechanisms for addressing potentially unreliable 
information contained in a PSI - it may either make verbal note of the evidence's 
unreliability on the record, or it may "redline" or make written notation on the 
PSI itself. See Rodrigquez, 132 Idaho at 262 n. l. "However, we regard the better 
procedure to be a "redlining" of the report, in which the court physically notes 
which portions are excluded. This procedure not only ensures a clear record for 
review but also protects the defendant against misuse of the unreliable information 
in the future." Id. Regardless, the courts have been consistently clear - the 
district court needs to make some indication as to whether the challenged 
information is reliable, otherwise the sentence is imposed in an abuse of 
discretion. See, e.g. Mauro, 121 Idaho at 183; Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262 n.l; 
Molen, 148 Idaho at 962. 
Mr. Pratt has demonstrated in the previous arguments as to why the sentence 
is illegal. This issue is just one more reason as to why the district court was 
required to conduct a new sentencing hearing rather than just issue a "Second 
Corrected Judgments and Sentence" as was done here. Not only were the findings 
under I.C. 19-2515, by the district court specifically finding it was murder 
under I.C. 18-4003(b), but the PSI was incorrect as well for it makes several 
references to this fact as well. 
For these reasons as Mr. Pratt requests that this Court find the district 
court abused its discretion in finding that the sentence was illegal and should 
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have found that Pratt was entitled to relief in a new sentencing hearing in order 
to make corrections to his PSI for his Findings were incorrect based upon the 
findings of aggravating circumstances outweighed all the mitigating circumstances. 
This goes specifically to the PSI investigator's comments as well in its 
recommendations. 
d. Pratt's current Rule 35 is not subject to res judicata 
In light of the facts and arguments set forth above, the facts in this case 
support that Pratt is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Yet, the district 
court here held that the matter was subject to res judicata. (#40940, R., p.42.) 
The question then becomes whether res judicata applies to an issue of subject 
matter jurisdiction and whether denial on procedural grounds means the issue(s) 
asserted in the prior Rule 35 proceedings were finally decided. 
There is persuasive authority determining the res judicata applies to the 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction: 
When a court has rendered a judgrrent in a contested action, the judgnent 
precludes the parties fran litigating the question of the court's subject 
mtter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except if: 
(1) The subject IIBtter of the action was so plainly beyond the court's 
jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a IlBilifest abuse of authority; or 
(2) Allowing the judgnent to stand would substantially infringe the 
authority of another tribunal or agency of gove:rnrrent; or 
(3) The judgnent was rendered by a court lacking capability to IIEke an 
adequately infonred determination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction 
and as a IJ.E.tter of procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgnent 
should have opportunity belated to attack the court's subject mtter jursidiction. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982). 
Mr. Pratt would assert that the second prong above applies to the case here 
for to allow the judgment to stand would subjstanitally infringe the authority 
of another government agency. That agency would be the Idaho Commission of Pardons 
17 
andParolealong with the IDOC. Both of these government agencies make use of 
Pratt's PSI in placement and rehabilitation, along with suitability for relase 
upon completion of rehabilitative programs. To not make corrections of the PSI 
is just as important to the matters concerning the Findings being incorrect as 
well. 
Pratt's request for the district court to find that his sentences were illegal 
due to the reasons set forth therein, clearly demonstrating that the sentences 
were erroneously decided. The district court has refused to correct the record, 
the PSI, and afford Mr. Pratt a new sentencing hearing. None of the issues presented 
in Pratt's Motion and Memorandum (#40940, R., pp.13-34) have been previously 
presented to the Court. He was not a party or privy to the matters as explained 
above and therefore the Rule 35 was not subject to res judicata and the state 
court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to correct the sentence for the 
reasons set forth above. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is requested this Court reverse the 
district court's order denying the Rule 35, remand the matter back with instructions 
that Pratt be entitled to have a new mitigation hearing pursuant to I.C. 19-2515, 
and Rule 31, ICR, and make corrections to the PSI with Pratt being present at 
said hearing. 
Grant any further relief justice may so allow. 
Respectfully sbumitted this OCTOBER 2014. 
Joseph E. Pratt, Appellant prose 
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1. That the trial court failed to correct the judgment and sentence 
pursuant to State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 594, 873 P.2d 848 (1994). 
The Supreme Court vacated Pratt's 'conviction on Count XVI for attempted felony 
murder. State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho at 601. The Corrected Judgments and Sentence 
. . 
entered on March 4, 1991 should be reentered with the provision for Count XVI stricken. 
2. Whether the trial court and the Supreme Court illegally sentenced 
Pratt for First Degree Murder of a Peace Officer. 
Count XVII of the Corrected Judgments and Sentence entered on December 11, 
1997 provides: 
COUNT XVII 
It is adjudged that the Defendant has been convicted 
upon a jury verdict of guilty on the 8th day of June, 1989, of 
the felony criminal offense of murder in the first degree, in 
violation of Idaho Code 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003(b) and 
(d), said offense occurring on January 12, 1989, as charged 
in the information. 
It is further adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as 
charged and convicted. It is further adjudged that the 
Defendant be sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State 
Board of Corrections to be held and incarcerated by said 
Board in a suitable place for the rest of his natural life, the first 
twenty-five years of which shall be a fixed and determinate 
sentence, followed by the remainder of said sentence which 
shall be indeterminate. 
It is further adjudged that said sentence to 
incarceration shall run consecutive to and following the 
sentences hereinabove imposed for aggravated assault, 
aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer and 
attempted first degree murder. 
_7.9-
The Supreme Court held that Pratt's conviction for First Degree Murder could not 
be based upon the killing of a peace officer in the lawful discharge of his official duty, I.C. 
§18-4003(b). The Court upheld Pratt's conviction for First Degree Murder based upon 
the felony murder standard, I.C. §18-4003(d). State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho at 598. 
Pratt was sentenced for First Degree Murder. The person he murdered was a law 
enforcement officer although he was not a "a peace officer in the lawful discharge of his 
official duty" under /.C. §18-4003(b). The Supreme Court reviewed Pratt's sentences and 
with the exception of Count XVI affirmed them. See State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho at 597 -
598 and 600 - 601. 
Other than the deletion in Count XVII of the reference to I.C. §18-4003(b) there is 
no basis to revisit Pratt's sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
After the sentence in Count XVI is stricken, the sentences imposed on November 
27, 1989, are within the range of lawful sentences for the crimes for which they were 
imposed. Pratt has failed to even suggest any reasonable basis for determining that the 
sentence imposed on Count XVII is an illegal sentence. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Pratt's /.C.R. 35 Motion is granted in part and 
denied in part. A Second Corrected Judgments and Sentence shall be entered 
- DATED this __ / .......... 4 __ day of December, 2000. 
--9iO-
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